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Following the recent turn towards quasi-experimental approaches in the US
literature on the incumbency advantage (Lee, 2001; Lee, forthcoming), we
employ a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to identify the causal ef-
fects of party incumbency in British and German post-World War II elections.
The RDD framework exploits the randomized variation in incumbency status
that occurs when a district race is close. Based on the assumption that par-
ties do not exert perfect control over their observed vote shares, incumbents
that barely won a race should be similar in their distribution of observed and
unobserved confounders to non-incumbents that barely lost. This provides
us with a naturally occurring counterfactual exploitable for causal inference
under a weaker set of assumptions than conventional regressions designs com-
monly used in the incumbency literature. In both British and German federal
elections, we ¯nd that party incumbency has a signi¯cant positive impact on
vote shares and the probability of winning in marginal districts, the sub-
population of interest for which incumbency advantage is likely to make a
di®erence. This stands in contrast to previous more ambiguous ¯ndings.
12 Introduction
The electoral advantage that incumbency bestows upon members of Congress
is one of the most studied aspects of congressional politics in the United
States (Gelman and King, 1990). Since the early 1970s, we have learnt a
great deal about the growth, the causes, and the consequences of incum-
bency advantage in American elections, both at the federal and state level.1
But more than twenty years ago, Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1984) already
lamented the exclusive focus of this literature on American political institu-
tions and the American political context. Since then, the study of the in-
cumbency advantage in democracies other than the Unites States has made
comparatively little progress. In the cases of Great Britain and Germany, for
example, we still do not have any reliable estimates of the causal e®ects of
incumbency, and the empirical ¯ndings in both cases are ambiguous in terms
of signs and signi¯cance.
Our paper aims to help ¯ll this lacuna. Following the recent turn towards
quasi-experimental approaches in the US literature on the incumbency ad-
vantage (Lee, 2001; Lee, forthcoming), we employ a Regression Discontinuity
Design (RDD) to identify the causal e®ects of party incumbency in British
and German post-World War II elections. The RDD allows for causal in-
1A by no means exhaustive list of works includes Erikson (1972), Alford and Hibbing
(1981), Born (1979), Collie (1981), Cover (1977), Cover and Mayhew (1977), Jacobson
(1987), Krehbiel and Wright (1983), Mayhew (1974), Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart
(2000), Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004), Ansolabehere, Snowberg and Snyder (2004), Cox
and Katz (2002), Gelman and King (1990), Gelman and Huang (2004), King and Gelman
(1991), Krashinsky and Milne (1993), Lee (forthcoming), Levitt and Wolfram (1997).
2ference under much weaker assumptions than commonly employed identi¯-
cation strategies such as the Gelman and King regression model (Gelman
and King, 1990) or more recent techniques such as instrumental variable
estimation (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2004).
Conceptualized in terms of the Rubin Causal model, the RDD frame-
work exploits the randomized treatment assignment to incumbency that oc-
curs when a district race is close. Since parties do not exert perfect control
over their observed vote shares, incumbents that did barely win the previous
election are virtually identical to non-incumbents that did barely lose, thus
providing us with a naturally occurring counterfactual exploitable for causal
inference. Whereas conventional estimations of incumbency advantage must
rely on the assumption that they can statistically control for all observed and
unobserved confounders, a condition that very rarely holds in practice, the
RDD estimate relies on the assumption of local random assignment at the
threshold of winning (Lee, 2001; Lee, forthcoming). If it holds, this ensures
an unconfounded identi¯cation of the incumbency advantage in marginal dis-
tricts, the subpopulation of interest for which incumbency advantage is likely
to make a di®erence.
Since assignment to treatment is randomized at the threshold (i.e. or-
thogonal to potential outcomes), inferences at this point can be as credible
as those obtained from a classical randomized experiment. Our estimates
should be una®ected by the inclusion or exclusion of any pre-treatment con-
trols; their inclusion should only result in lower sampling variability. In
3contrast, conventional identi¯cation strategies are largely based on obser-
vations located far from the threshold, where assignment to treatment is
confounded by self-selection. Given that self-selection is usually based on
unobserved characteristics, causal inference seems like a hopeless endeavor
for such observations; the identi¯cation of unbiased causal estimates using
conventional regression designs is very unlikely (LaLonde, 1986; Dehejia and
Wahba, 1999). Our theories are simply too crude and our data are too lim-
ited to allow us any real con¯dence that we can \control" for all confounding
factors. (Local) random assignment obviates this concern and enables us to
draw reliable causal inferences.
In contrast to the mixed ¯ndings of previous studies, we will demonstrate
below that in close races incumbency in both British and German federal
elections has a robust and positive e®ect on a party's fortune. The magnitude
of the party incumbency advantage is fairly similar in both countries; we
estimate it to be around 1-2 percentage points of vote share or an approximate
.20 increase in the probability of winning. While not nearly as large as the
incumbency advantage observed in recent US House elections, these e®ects
can nonetheless have an impact on races in marginal districts. Our results
are also robust to a series of falsi¯cation tests.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief
review of existing studies on the incumbency e®ect in British and German
elections, as well as the potential threats to validity these studies are faced
with. The following two sections introduce our model and estimation strategy
4and discuss the conditions under which RDDs will (not) allow for reliable
causal inferences. Section ¯ve presents our empirical ¯ndings. Sections six
and seven present balance and robustness tests. Section eight concludes.
3 The Quest for Identi¯cation { Prior Esti-
mates of the Incumbency Advantage
Scholars working on the incumbency advantage in non-American settings
have generally followed the identi¯cation strategies employed by their Amer-
ican colleagues. It is therefore instructive to quickly review the American
literature on the incumbency advantage before turning to the work done on
Great Britain and Germany.
For U.S. House elections, the literature can be roughly divided into three
stages. Early works relied on \sophomore surges" and \retirement slumps"
(among others) to estimate the incumbency advantage (e.g. Erikson, 1972;
Cover and Mayhew, 1977; Born, 1979; Payne, 1980).2 In a path-breaking
article, Gelman and King (1990) have shown that the identi¯cation strategies
employed in these studies were all problematic. They introduced an improved
estimator, often referred to as the `Gelman and King' model.3 Many scholars
2Gelman and King (1990) provide a review of this early literature.
3Gelman and King proposed a linear regression of the Democratic vote share in district
j at time t on three independent variables: the lagged Democratic vote share in district
j at time t ¡ 1, an incumbency status variable (¡1 if there is a Republican incumbent
running, 0 for open seats, and 1 for a Democrat incumbent running), and a dummy variable
indicating which party won the seat in the last election. Under certain assumptions, the
least squares estimate of the coe±cient for the incumbency status variable provides an
5directly adopted their approach or added twists and tweaks such as non-
linear incumbency e®ects and selection bias correction procedures (Cox and
Katz, 2002; Krashinsky and Milne, 1993; Levitt and Wolfram, 1997).
For about a decade, the Gelman and King approach has been regarded
as \state-of-the-art" (Cox and Katz, 2002, p. 33). An increasing awareness
of the strong assumptions on which it rests, however, has led scholars to look
for alternatives such as quasi-experiments.4 Quasi-experiments represent an
important departure from conventional regression models, because they ex-
plicitly capitalize on exogenous or random variation in treatment assignment
to identify the incumbency advantage instead of trying to \control" for po-
tentially confounding covariates by including them in the regression equation.
For example, in a highly original article, Ansolabehere et al. (2000) use the
decennial redistricting as a natural experiment to contrast the incumbent's
vote in the old parts of his district with his vote in the new parts of his dis-
trict. This allows them to estimate the electoral bene¯ts of each incumbent's
\home-style."5
unbiased estimate of how much larger the incumbent's party vote share would have been
with an incumbent defending the district as opposed to a non-incumbent.
4As Gelman and King themselves admit, their model assumes that the decision to run
for reelection is orthogonal to the number of votes that the incumbent would get if he
decided to run. To the extent that there is strategic exit (Cox and Katz, 2002; Jacobson
and Dimock, 1994), this will lead to biased estimates. Another problem is the exclusion
of variables such as incumbent quality. If incumbent quality is related both to treatment
assignment at time t¡1 and vote share at time t, which appears plausible, estimates will
be biased upwards due to omitted variable bias.
5Note that the counterfactual implicit in their work is more narrow than usual, since it
only contrasts the incumbent's vote share in new and old districts. Their model excludes
other possible sources of incumbency advantage such as the cue contained in the label
\incumbent" and also assumes that redistricting is not strategic (but see Cox and Katz,
6Most relevant to our paper, economist David Lee (2001; forthcoming)
employs a quasi-experimental research design to estimate the causal e®ects of
U.S. House incumbency. Relying on a regression-discontinuity design (RDD),
he uses close elections at time t ¡ 1, for which treatment assignment can be
considered random, to estimate the causal e®ects of incumbency at time t.
We will discuss Lee's model more carefully below.
Quasi-experimental approaches have not been applied to German or British
federal elections yet. In fact, all of the existing work relies on some variant
of Gelman and King's regression model or less sophisticated identi¯cation
strategies. We now turn to a brief review of these studies.
3.1 Germany
Lancaster's (1998) study was the ¯rst to address the incumbency advan-
tage in German post-World War II elections.6 Lancaster regresses a binary
dependent variable for winning or losing a district on candidate-speci¯c inde-
pendent variables (age, gender, and incumbency status) and ¯nds a positive
and statistically signi¯cant e®ect of incumbency on the probability of win-
ning. But omitted factors such as candidate quality or district-speci¯c factors
related both to treatment assignment and potential outcomes are likely to
2002).
6Under Germany's mixed electoral system, each voter has two votes. The ¯rst or
\district" vote is cast for candidates in SMDs under plurality voting. The second or \party
list" vote determines the overall balance of seats in the Bundestag. Half the members of
the Bundestag are elected in SMDs, the other half is elected through party lists. Bawn
(1999) provides a concise review of the German electoral system.
7lead to biased inferences.
Bawn (1999) examines a similar sample of German federal elections (1969-
87) by looking at candidate vote gaps, de¯ned as the district candidate's
share of the ¯rst vote minus his party's share of the second vote in the same
district. Bawn then considers positive candidate vote gaps as evidence for
incumbency e®ects, which she estimates to be between :5 and 1 percentage
points. Note, however, that Bawn's analysis cannot distinguish between in-
cumbency advantage and any personal characteristics of incumbents. Indeed,
Bawn (1999, p.494) herself notes that incumbency status \may also capture
intangible elements ...such as the degree to which the representative `¯ts' the
district in terms of personal ideology or style." Moreover, Bawn's approach
assumes that party votes are exogenous to ¯rst votes. If a popular incumbent
is able to not only garner a large share of the ¯rst vote, but also to raise the
standing of his party in the district more generally, the gap between ¯rst and
party vote shares will be a biased estimate of the incumbency advantage.
Cox and Schoppa (2002) ¯nd evidence for such interaction e®ects across ¯rst
and second tiers in mixed-member electoral systems, including Germany's.
3.2 Great Britain
Textbook accounts of British politics characterize British elections as purely
party-or leader-centered and leave little room for any incumbency advantage.
More recent work, well summarized in Gaines (1998), has challenged this
traditional picture. Cain et al. (1984) have argued that district services
8provided by members of Parliament give rise to a noticeable incumbency
advantage. But while their ¯ndings (based on a survey at the time of the
1979 general election as well as interviews with MPs and party agents) are
quite suggestive, they fall short of a systematic assessment.
Gaines (1998) uses a regression model close to Gelman and King's but
estimates separate equations for each major party and also includes a set of
¯xed e®ects. The results are quite mixed; depending on the exact speci¯ca-
tion, Gaines ¯nds a small positive or sometimes even negative incumbency
advantage. He concludes that \in Great Britain, incumbency advantage is
either very small or else very elusive" (Gaines, 1998, p. 188)
Katz and King (1999), the most recent contribution, also applies the
Gelman and King model to the British multi-party system, but impute data
for partially contested districts and model the multiparty data according to a
additive logistic t distribution. The authors ¯nd a small positive incumbency
advantage in post-World War II British elections, with an e®ect size of :5
percentage points for the conservatives, 1 percentage point for Labour, and
about 3 percentage points for the Alliance.
Given that the existing literature has largely adopted Gelman and King's
(1990) identi¯cation strategy (or even more problematic ones), our knowledge
about the incumbency advantage in British and German elections remains
quite limited. The quasi-experimental research design that we rely on avoids
many of the strong and implausible assumptions hitherto common in the
literature. Of course, RDDs also rest on certain assumptions. But as we will
9show in the next section, these assumptions turn out to be weaker than the
assumptions necessary for more traditional estimations strategies to work.
There is one important caveat, however. The causal e®ect estimated by
our RDD is not directly comparable to earlier estimates of incumbency advan-
tage. The existing literature focuses on the legislator incumbency advantage,
while the RDD approach identi¯es an overall party incumbency advantage.
As de¯ned by Gelman and King (1990), the legislator incumbency advantage
measures the di®erence between the proportion of the vote received by an
incumbent legislator in his district, and the proportion of the vote received
by the incumbent party in that district, if the incumbent legislator does not
run. The party incumbency advantage identi¯es a related, though not iden-
tical counterfactual: the \electoral gain to being the incumbent party in a
district, relative to not being the incumbent party" (Lee, forthcoming, p.
23). So, in a sense, party incumbency is a broader concept than legislative
incumbency. It subsumes legislator incumbency but also contains the advan-
tage that a party might enjoy simply from having won the district the last
time, no matter whether the incumbent legislator runs again or not. Given
the overarching role of political parties in both British and German politics
compared to individual legislators, party incumbency seems to be the more
relevant concept.
104 Regression-Discontinuity Designs
In our empirical analysis we rely on a regression-discontinuity design (RDD)
to obtain estimates of the causal e®ect of party incumbency on a variety of
outcomes such as vote share changes or the probability of winning the dis-
trict in the next election. The RDD is a quasi-experimental framework that
allows for identi¯cation of treatment e®ects in settings in which assignment
to treatment changes discontinuously as a function of one or more underlying
variables.
The earliest published example of RDDs dates back to Thistlethwaite and
Campbell (1960). They examine the e®ect of scholarships on career outcomes
by comparing students just above and below a threshold in tests scores that
determined whether students were granted the award. The underlying idea
is that in the close neighborhood of the threshold, assignment to treatment
is as good as random. Accordingly, unlucky students that just missed the
threshold are virtually identical to lucky ones who scored just above the
cuto® value. The only di®erence between them is that the latter received
the treatment while the former did not, thus providing us with a natural
counterfactual for causal inference.
A data generating process characterized by assignment to treatment be-
ing solely based on exceeding a threshold on a predetermined covariate arises
surprisingly often in empirical settings. Since the early work by Thistleth-
waite and Campbell, RDDs have been frequently used in various disciplines
11such as medicine and public health, education, economics, and sociology.7
Whereas in political science this identi¯cation strategy still seems somewhat
under-exploited, the econometrics and program evaluation literature has re-
cently seen a renewed interest in RDDs.8 Most relevant for the purpose of
this paper, David Lee (2001; forthcoming) for the ¯rst time applied a RDD
framework to the estimation of incumbency advantage in U.S. House elec-
tions. Similar RDDs have been employed to study incumbency e®ects in
India (Linden, 2004) and Ghana (Miguel and Zaidi, 2003) as well as split-
party delegations in the U.S. Senate (Butler and Butler, 2005). Our empirical
strategy largely follows the methodology employed in these papers.
5 The Model
Due to its quasi-experimental character, the RDD9 is best formulated in the
framework of the Rubin Causal Model and related methods that conceptu-
alize causal inference in terms of potential outcomes under treatment and
control (Rubin, 1974; Rubin, 1978; Rubin, 1990; Holland, 1986; Angrist and
Krueger, 1999; Rosenbaum, 2002).
7Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002, p. 208) provide a long list of applications. Also
see Trochim (1984) for further examples and an introduction to the RDD.
8For recent theoretical work on identi¯cation and estimation of RDDs see Hahn, Todd,
and van der Klaauw (2001); Porter (2002); Battistin and Rettore (2002; 2003); Lee and
Card (2004); and Lee (forthcoming). Recent empirical applications in economics include
Angrist and Lavy (1999); Black (1999); Berk and de Leeuw (1999); Lee, Moretti, and
Butler (2004); DiNardo and Lee (2004); Martorell (2004); and Matsudaira (2004).
9There are generally two types of RDDs: the fuzzy and the sharp design (Trochim,
1984). Here we only focus on the sharp design.
12First, we need to introduce some notation. Let TV Si;j;t denote the actual
(i.e. "true") vote share of party j in district i in an election at time t. For
tractability, we assume that the same parties stage candidates in election t
and t ¡ 1.10 Assume further that the observed vote share party j receives is
represented by OV Si;j;t, which is the sum of two components:
OV Si;j;t = TV Si;j;t + ´i;j;t (1)
Here TV Si;j;t re°ects a systematic, or predictable component that is a
function of the party's individual attributes or actions (such as the experience
or likability of the party's candidate, campaigning e®orts, etc.), and ´i;j;t is a
exogenous, random chance component (such as the weather on election day,
tra±c conditions, etc.) with mean zero and a continuous density (more on
this point below).
Following Lee (forthcoming), we de¯ne \incumbency e®ect" as the overall
causal impact of being the current incumbent party on the votes obtained in
a district election. Thus, let Di;j;t be a binary indicator of treatment status
that takes on the value of 1 if party j is the incumbent in district i at time
t; and 0 otherwise. Under a ¯rst-past-the-post system, treatment status (i.e.
whether a party becomes the incumbent or not) is determined by whether
its observed vote share exceeds that of its strongest opponent in district i in
the election at t ¡ 1. To compute this margin of victory, we rank parties in
10As we will explain below, this assumption is not a problem here since all parties
generally stage candidates in all district in our sample.
13each district by their observed vote shares in the election at t¡1. Let W be
the party with the largest observed vote share and W ¡ 1 be the party with
the second largest observed vote. Then we can easily derive the margin of
victory as:
MVi;j;t¡1 = OV Si;j;t¡1 ¡ OV Si;W¡1;t¡1 (2)
if a party is the winning party in a district and for every other party
MVi;j;t¡1 = OV Si;j;t¡1 ¡ OV Si;W;t¡1 (3)
Note that by construction MV will be positive for winning and negative for
loosing parties. The threshold, label it ¹ MV , is zero. Once we de¯ne MV this
way, we obtain a setting suitable for the RDD framework. Note that assign-
ment to treatment is a deterministic function of whether a party's MVt¡1 ex-
ceeds the threshold of ¹ MV t¡1. We can write this as Dt = 1[MVt¡1 ¸ ¹ MV t¡1]
where [¢] is an indicator function that takes on the value of 1 if the condition
within [¢] is true and 0 otherwise.11
Finally, let Y1ij denote the potential outcome party j would attain in
district i if exposed to the treatment and let Y0ij denote its potential outcome
without the treatment in the same district. Our outcomes of interest are
changes in vote share or the probability of winning in the election at time t.
Potential outcomes refer to possibly counterfactual events. The well
known \fundamental problem of causal inference" (Holland, 1986) is that
11Note that, although possible in theory, there are no ties in our data.
14for each unit i, we never observe both potential outcomes Y1ij and Y0ij simul-
taneously, but only the realized outcome Yij = Dij ¢Y1ij +(1¡Dij)¢Y0ij. For
example, given that a party is the incumbent, we never observe the outcome
it would have attained had it not been the incumbent in the same district
race. It is thus impossible to estimate individual causal e®ects (Y1ij ¡ Y0ij).
However, we can, under certain assumptions, estimate the average treatment
e®ect ATE = E[Y1 ¡ Y0] or the average treatment e®ect for the treated
ATT = E[Y1 ¡ Y0jD = 1] for a given population.
The strength of the RDD derives from the fact that we know the as-
signment mechanism. Under fairly weak assumptions, this allows for an
identi¯cation of the ATE at the discontinuity of the covariate that deter-
mines treatment assignment. Such an estimate can be as credible as a causal
inference drawn from a randomized experiment. More formally, when the
support of the assignment variable, in our case MVt¡1, is continuous and
E[Y0] is \smooth" at the threshold that determines assignment to treatment,
in our case ¹ MV t¡1, then the ATE is identi¯ed at the threshold:12
ATE = E[Y1 ¡ Y0jMVt¡1 = ¹ MV t¡1] (4)
= E[Y1jMVt¡1 = ¹ MV t¡1] ¡ lim
"!0
E[Y0jMVt¡1 = ¹ MV t¡1 ¡ "] (5)
= E[Y jMVt¡1 = ¹ MV t¡1] ¡ lim
"!0
E[Y jMVt¡1 = ¹ MV t¡1 ¡ "] (6)
12The proof that the RDD provides an unbiased estimate of the treatment at the discon-
tinuity has been derived by several authors. For details see Goldberger (1972a; 1972b); Ru-
bin (1977); Cappelleri (1991); Hahn, Todd, and van der Klauuw (2001); Lee (2001; forth-
coming).
15The identi¯cation assumption here is that E[Y0jMVt¡1] is smooth at ¹ MV t¡1;
there is no discontinuity at this threshold.13 This assumption allows to at-
tribute any discontinuity at the threshold to the treatment, because it implies
that given a small enough " the incumbents marginally above the threshold
provide a valid counterfactual for those non-incumbents marginally below.14
Note that one limitation here is that this ATE is in fact only a local ATE,
because identi¯cation relies on marginal elections which may not be repre-
sentative of all elections (more on this point below).
Why would equation 6 yield a quasi-experimental, unbiased causal es-
timate of the party incumbency e®ect, given the non-random selection to
treatment? After all, MVt¡1 is usually correlated with potential outcomes
and the threshold ( ¹ MV t¡1) is known a priori to the parties. The reason why
the RDD nonetheless provides an unbiased estimate is the assumption of lo-
cal random assignment in the close neighborhood of the threshold.15 Recall
13As usual in causal inference, for this result to hold we also need two additional assump-
tions: First, following Cox (1958), we need to assume "no interference between units," i.e.
what Rubin (1978) refers to as the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUVTA).
SUVTA implies that the treatment status of one unit does not a®ect potential outcomes
for the other units (see also Rubin (1974) regarding this assumption in the RDD context).
In our case this means that whether or not a party is the incumbent in one district has no
impact on the outcomes in any other district. This assumption is non-testable, but if it
is violated, causal inference becomes very di±cult if not impossible (?). Second, we need
to assume that treatment does not cause the assignment variable (Rubin, 1974). This is
not a problem here because whether or not a party becomes the incumbent is determined
after the election.
14As Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2002, p.237) put it: \even if the latter statistics are
not transparent to the reader, a more common sense rationale should be: If participants
with assignment scores at 50.05 [...] perform remarkably better on the outcome variable
than participants at 49.95, surely, the .05 (sic) di®erence between them on the assignment
variable is unlikely to account for that improvement."
15This logic is fully developed by Lee (forthcoming).
16from equations 1 ¡ 3 that the margin of victory is a function of observed
vote shares. Observed vote shares in turn consist of a systematic component
(TV Si;j;t) that parties can in°uence, but also a random component (´i;j;t)
over which parties exert no control. It can be proven that as long as the
covariate that determines assignment to treatment includes such a random
component with a continuous density, treatment status at the threshold is
statistically randomized (Lee, forthcoming).
This assures that at the threshold, all observed and unobserved con-
founders determined prior to assignment will be orthogonal to treatment
status (formally, we can write this conditional independence assumption as
Y1ij;Y0ij?Di;j;tjMVi;j;t¡1 = ¹ MV i;j;t¡1). Accordingly, as in a randomized ex-
periment, our ATE estimate will not be confounded by omitted variables
and should be una®ected by the inclusion of pre-treatment covariates, which
would only result in lower sampling variability. This assumption of local
conditional independence is testable at least for the observed confounders
using common covariate balance tests known from randomized experiments
or matching estimators. When the local randomization "worked," treatment
and control group should yield similar distributions of baseline characteris-
tics in the neighborhood of the threshold. We provide such balance tests in
a separate section below.
It is important to brie°y consider the condition under which the identi¯-
cation assumption of local random assignment breaks down. Local random
assignment critically hinges on the presence of the random component (´i;j;t).
17We do not imply that each election has to be decided by this random compo-
nent; in many non-close elections the random component will not be decisive.
The key idea is that as elections become closer and closer, confounders no
longer systematically a®ect assignment to treatment. In the limit, i.e. at the
threshold, we should obtain conditional independence for all confounders.
The plausibility of this assumption is a function of the degree to which par-
ties are able to sort around the threshold (Lee, 2001; Lee, forthcoming). For
example, if parties had perfect control over their observed vote shares or were
at least able to perfectly predict them, they would never run if they knew
they would loose. Alternatively, they would just invest enough e®ort to get
exactly one more vote than the strongest district opponent. This would
clearly violate our identifying assumption, as it would lead to a discontinuity
in E[Y0] at the threshold. However, given the randomness inherent in elec-
tion outcomes, such a scenario seems implausible. Just imagine the weather
had been di®erent on election day (Knack, 1994).
Before we proceed to estimation, a potential limitation of the RDD needs
to be addressed. As noted above, our ATE estimate does not identify the
average treatment e®ect for the entire population, but only for close elections.
However, these marginal elections may not be representative of the whole
population of elections. In fact, as we move further away from the threshold,
local random assignment will cease to hold. We have no reason to believe
that marginal and non-marginal districts are su±ciently similar. So unless
we retreat to additional homogeneity assumptions, our incumbency e®ect
18estimate will not be applicable to the latter districts. Our data per se are
only informative about the e®ect of D at the threshold.
However, when looking at the incumbency advantage, marginal districts
are exactly the subpopulation of interest. It is only in these close elections
that the incumbency advantage is likely to be decisive for the election out-
come. Moreover, marginal districts are not uncommon in both our cases.
For example, over 20 (40) percent of all races in an average German federal
election are close, with the winner of each district leading by less than 5 (10)
percentage points.16 In the British data, about 14 (25) percent of all races in
an average general election are close, with the winner of each district leading
by less than 5 (10) percentage points.
6 Estimation Strategy
Our model suggests the following data generating process for the observed
outcomes:
Yi;j;t = f(Zi;j;µ) + h(MVi;j;t¡1;±) + Di;j¯ + "i;j (7)
where f is some function according to which Z, a vector of district level
covariates (e.g. campaigns e®orts, etc.), may a®ect votes in the current
election with coe±cients µ. h is some function that relates the margin of
victory in the previous election to votes in the next election. Parties that
16Bawn (1999, 493) also provides evidence that winning gaps in German district races
are fairly small.
19did well in the last election are more likely to do well in the current election.
Finally, D is our incumbent indicator and ¯ is the central parameter of
interest that identi¯es the party incumbency advantage.
At a ¯rst glance, equation 7 is just a conventional regression setup (like
the Gelman and King Model). The fundamental problem that has plagued
these conventional estimates of incumbency advantage is that there may be
some unobserved Z that we cannot control for (like unobserved candidate
characteristics, etc.), and since Z is likely to be correlated with MV and
thus D estimates of ¯ tend to be biased. The key advantage of the RDD
is as follows: If our (fairly weak) assumptions hold and conditional on the
parties' attributes and actions, there exist a random chance component with
a continuous density as part of the assignment variable, then thanks to local
random assignment our estimate of ¯ will be un-confounded at the thresh-
old MVi;j;t¡1 = ¹ MV i;j;t¡1 = 0. Since treatment variation at the threshold
is randomized, we do not need to control for additional covariates. Just
like in a randomized experiment, inclusion of covariates should not a®ect
¯, apart from reducing sampling variability, because randomization ensures
conditional independence.
As is well known, the real problem in drawing inferences from a RDD is
getting the functional form of h right. Since D should only pick up the poten-
tial \jump" in the conditional expectation of E[Y jMVi;j;t¡1] at the threshold,
it is clear that a miss-speci¯cation of the functional form of h feeds into bias
20in ¯. Two main solutions to this problem have been proposed.17 The ¯rst
and most common method is to stick with a parametric model, but allow for
a highly °exible functional functional of E[Y jMVi;j;t¡1] by including higher
order polynomials in MV plus all interactions with the treatment indicator
into h.18 Polynomials usually ensure a good ¯t of the functional form on both
sides of the threshold and render it relatively insensitive to outliers. The sec-
ond and more recent solution relies on non-parametric or semi-parametric
estimators (Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw, 2001; Porter, 2002) to identify
the conditional expectation function at the threshold. No functional form as-
sumption is required. Instead, one ¯ts a semi- or non-parametric relationship
to both sides of the threshold and then takes the di®erence at the discontinu-
ity point. Porter (2002) recently derived a local polynomial estimator (based
on a kernel regression) that achieves the optimal rate of convergence under a
broad set of conditions. One problem is that there is no commonly accepted
optimality criterion for the bandwidth choice of the kernel.19 For ease of
presentation, we display the parametric solution below. The non-parametric
solution is used in the robustness section.
17Note that these two solutions require that the variable that determines assignment to
treatment is continuous, as in our case. If this variable is discrete, a combination estimator
can be used. See Lee and Card (2004) for details.
18Thus we estimate Y = MV +MV 2 +MV 3 +MV 4 +D +D ¤MV +D ¤MV 2 +D ¤
MV 3 +D ¤MV 4. The coe±cient on D identi¯es the ATE, because at the threshold MV
equals zero.
19A problem here is the bias arising from the bad boundary behavior of the kernel; at
the boundary the bias of the kernel converges to zero at a slower rate than at interior
points. For details see Hahn, Todd, and van der Klauuw (2001); Porter (2002); and also
Fan (1992) and Haerdle (1990).
217 Data
We use two data-sets in our analysis. For the German case, our data are
taken from Caramani (2000). We originally planned to examine all federal
elections to the Bundestag in the 1957-2002 period. But due to several rounds
of redistricting, we had to exclude the 1957, 1976, 1980, and 2002 elections.
This leaves us with 9 elections. There are about 248 districts per election up
to 1990, and 328 districts since Uni¯cation. In our analysis, we also exclude
the districts in East Germany due to lack of variation. For these districts,
information on lagged vote shares or incumbency status only exists for two
elections (1994 and 1998); there are also only 38 districts in which party
incumbency switched between parties.20
In virtually all of the district races, the strongest two parties are the
Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Party (CDU),
although third parties obtain some share of the vote. Accordingly, we only
focus on the incumbency advantage for these two parties. Note that partially
contested districts are not a problem in Germany because the same parties
generally run candidates in all districts.21
20All our ¯ndings are substantively identical if we include East German districts. Results
are available upon request.
21The two big parties as well as the Free Democrats (FDP) have staged candidates in
virtually all districts throughout our sample period. The Greens have only entered the
political landscape in the early 80s. Fortunately, their pattern of entry has been rather
"clean." In the election of 1983, which was the ¯rst elections in which the Greens ran
district candidates at all, they already did so in all but four districts. In later elections
they ran candidates in all but two districts. Exclusion of these few partially contested
districts leaves all our results una®ected.
22For the British case, we draw upon the data-set used in Katz and King
(1999), which includes English constituency level results for the 1955-1992
period. The data-set is adjusted for redistricting and contains about 480-
500 races per election. The parties of interest are the Labour Party and
the Conservative Party (hereafter "Tories"). Smaller regional parties are
excluded (for details see King and Katz (1999, 17)). Due to lack of variation,
we provide no incumbency estimates for the Alliance.22
One issue that needs to be addressed for the British case is the problem
of partially contested districts. As is well known, inferences from multiparty
electoral data are problematic when parties strategically decide to run candi-
dates in only some districts, because \di®erent numbers of parties composing
the `other' category will generally have a large e®ect on a variable such as the
percentage of votes for the governing party." (Katz and King (1999, 16)).
One potential solution to this problem is to impute \expected" vote shares
for all parties in partially contested districts (Katz and King, 1999; King,
Honaker, Joseph and Scheve, 2001; Honaker, Katz and King, 2002). How-
ever, our focus is not to solve this problem here. Thus, in order to keep the
analysis tractable and to avoid the necessity of making additional assump-
tion for the imputation procedure, we opt for a simpler, yet very common
solution. We exclude all those current and lagged district races in which the
Alliance did not stage candidates. Note that this results in some informa-
22The Alliance only had 68 incumbents over the whole sample period. Given the low
power of the RDD, this is not enough variation to obtain reliable estimates.
23tion loss, but e®ectively eliminates any bias that may result from partially
contested districts.23 As Katz and King show, no bias exists for those dis-
tricts in which all parties contest. Most previous studies of the incumbency
advantage have made similar exclusions (Gelman and King, 1990; Levitt and
Wolfram, 1997).
Our analysis is focused on the incumbency advantage at the level of the
party in a district, regardless of the identity of the speci¯c candidate a party
stages. For each of the four parties of interest (SPD, CDU, Tories, and
Labour), we compute the margin of victory for each district as described in
equations 2 ¡ 3. We then estimate the causal e®ect of party incumbency by
regressing our outcomes on a fourth order polynomial in the margin of victory
in the previous election and all interactions with the incumbency dummy (so
that we achieve a good ¯t of the conditional expectation of Y on both sides
of the threshold). At this point, we include no additional covariates in the
speci¯cation (we will add covariates in the robustness section). The causal
e®ect of party incumbency is simply the \gap" in the conditional expectation
of Y at the threshold, contrasting the situation when a party is and is not
the incumbency in a particular district. In order to avoid strong assumptions
about the error terms, we use a robust estimator for the variance/covariance
matrix.
As our outcome variables, we employ two measures of a party's success in
23We only lose about 22 percent of the district races, mostly in early elections. After
1970, the Alliance ran candidates in almost all districts.
24the next election: the party's vote share, and the probability that the party
will win the race.
8 Findings
8.1 German Case
Table 1 shows our central ¯ndings for the German case. Party incumbency
has a robust and sizeable causal e®ect on both a party's vote share and
the probability of winning a district race. This incumbency e®ect is very
similar for both the SDP and the CDU in terms of magnitude and statistical
signi¯cance. On average, incumbency raises a party's vote share by about
1.5 percentage points; it also increases the predicted probability of winning
a race by about 0.20. All e®ects are signi¯cant at least at the .10 level.
A graphical representation of the incumbency e®ect on vote share is pro-
vided in ¯gure 1 for the CDU and ¯gure 2 for the SPD. In these graphs, the
vertical axis displays the respective party's vote share in the district election
at time t. The horizontal axis is the margin of victory at time t ¡ 1 (the
party's vote share minus that of its strongest opponent), with the dashed
vertical line at zero marking the threshold. All observations to the right
(left) of the dashed line represent incumbents (non-incumbents). The red
curve plots the ¯tted values from our polynomial ¯t on both sides of the
threshold. Finally, each data-point represents a local average of the outcome
variable for intervals of the margin of victory variable (each interval is 0.05
25wide).
Several features are apparent in the graphs. First, note that for both
parties there is a positive relationship between the margin of victory and the
election outcome. This of course is what we would expect to ¯nd. If a party
wins (looses) by a larger margin at time t ¡ 1, it is more likely to receive a
higher (lower) vote share at time t. Second, and most importantly, there is
a noticeable discontinuity right at the threshold of zero. This represents the
causal e®ect of party incumbency. For both parties, candidates that barely
won the previous election are signi¯cantly more likely to obtain a higher
vote share (or win) in the current election than those that barely lost. This
e®ect is un-confounded, given that local random assignment at the threshold
ensures that candidates just below and above the cuto® are likely to be
similar in all respects expect their treatment status (see our balance tests
below). If party incumbency had no causal e®ect, we would expect no such
discontinuity at the threshold. Note that nowhere except at the threshold
do we see a discontinues jump in the conditional expectation function; there
exists a smooth, rather well-behaved relationship between the two variables
that is well approximated by our multiplicative polynomial ¯t.24
8.2 British Case
Our central ¯ndings for the British case are displayed in table 2. Very similar
to our results for Germany, we ¯nd a robust positive causal e®ect of party
24Similar graphs for the probability of winning are available upon request.
26incumbency for both parties. The magnitude of the incumbency e®ect is
slightly bigger for the Tories than for the Labour party, although not signi¯-
cantly so. In his regard our ¯ndings di®er from Katz and King (1999), which
¯nds signi¯cant di®erences between the two parties. Party incumbency is es-
timated to increase the vote share by about 1.8 percentage points for Labour,
and by about 2.6 percentage points for the Tories. Similarly, party incum-
bency increases the probability of winning a race by about 0.18 for Labour
and by about 0.23 for the Tories. All e®ects are signi¯cant at least at the
.10 level.
Graphical representations of the incumbency e®ect on vote share are pro-
vided in ¯gure 3 for the Tories and in ¯gure 4 for Labour. The patterns
are very similar to the ¯gures shown for the German case. Again, there is
a clear \jump" at the threshold of winning, while elsewhere the conditional
expectation of the outcome variable is smooth and well-behaved.25
It needs to be emphasized that, as we indicated above, these estimates of
the party incumbency e®ect are informative only for marginal districts. They
cannot be extrapolated to non-marginal district without making additional
assumptions about the homogeneity of close and non-close district elections.
Yet, given both the number of marginal district races and the magnitudes
of the party incumbency e®ects estimated above, the incumbency advantage
in marginal districts is likely to have a substantial impact on the overall
election outcome. Moreover, given the inherent self-selection to treatment
25Similar graphs for the probability of winning are available upon request.
27in the rest of the data, there is little hope of estimating causal e®ects at a
greater distance from the threshold.
9 Balance Tests
As we have explained above, our inferences rest on the assumption of local
random assignment at the threshold. In this section, we test this assumption
for the pre-treatment covariates that we have data for.26 If, in the limit, there
is randomized variation in treatment status, we expect the covariates that
are determined prior to treatment assignment to be balanced in the close
neighborhood of the threshold. Take turnout at time t ¡ 1, for example.
At the threshold, there should be no systematic di®erence between districts
that were barely won and districts that were barely lost. In other words,
there should be no \jump" in the conditional expectation of pre-determined
covariates at the threshold.
Table 3 provides evidence for the German case that is consistent with
the assumption that treatment variation at the threshold is randomized |
at least for the covariates that we do observe. For both parties, we do not
¯nd any signi¯cant di®erences at the threshold for vote share, turnout, and
various (linear) combinations of the two. We also do not ¯nd any signi¯-
cant di®erences for state dummies except for one, which is what one may
26Unfortunately, we are currently left with a rather limited set of covariates. But hope-
fully we will be able to ¯nd more covariates. We plan to add balance tests for other
covariates in future redrafts.
28reasonably expect even in a randomized experiment because of sampling
variability.27
Figures 5 and 6 present graphical representations of the balance tests for
the lagged vote share variables. These graphs are identical to the ones shown
in the previous section, except that this time we put the party's lagged vote
share on the vertical axis. Since the vote share of a party is determined before
incumbency status is assigned, incumbency should not have any e®ect on this
variable, i.e. there should be no discontinuity at the threshold. Clearly, this
is the case for both parties, lending con¯dence to our assumption of local
random assignment regarding this important confounder.
Table 4 displays similar balance tests for the British case. Unfortunately,
given our data constraints, we are currently restricted to tests of lagged
vote share only.28 Yet, at least with regard to this important confounder,
the null of balance cannot be rejected at conventional levels for either party.
Figures 7 and 8 con¯rm this graphically; again, we do not ¯nd any noticeable
discontinuity at the threshold.
Overall, these balance tests lend con¯dence to the assumption that treat-
ment status is indeed randomized at the threshold, although clearly more
27As is well known, in randomized experiments balance across the universe of observed
and unobserved confounders obtains only in the limit as N ¡! 1. In any ¯nite sample,
one may end up with a bad draw. Also note the possibility of type I errors. At the
.10 level, we expect one in ten signi¯cance tests to incorrectly reject the null of covariate
balance, even if we had true balance in all ten tests.
28Balance is particular important regarding lagged vote share, because this confounder
by itself impounds many important characteristics of a district race. Yet, more covariate
tests would clearly be desirable here.
29balance tests using additional predetermined covariates would be desirable.
10 Robustness
In this section, we subject our ¯ndings to various falsi¯cation tests. If our
assumption of local random assignment at the threshold is valid, our in-
cumbency estimates should be somewhat insensitive to the inclusion of pre-
determined covariates. Just like in a randomized experiment, their inclusion
should only increase the precision of our incumbency estimates, because the
covariates will soak up some of the variance from the error term.
Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate that this is the case for the German data. In
fact, for both parties, the causal e®ect of party incumbency on vote share is
remarkably robust across di®erent speci¯cations.29 Since the ¯ndings in both
tables are substantively similar, they can be discussed at the same time.
In both tables, column 1 presents the baseline estimates of the party
incumbency e®ect based on our polynomial without any additional covariates.
In column 2, we add each party's lagged vote share to the speci¯cation. It
enters highly signi¯cant. More important, for both parties the magnitude
of the incumbency e®ect remains almost identical, while precision is slightly
increased. In column 3 we add lagged turnout and a squared term for lagged
vote share; the incumbency estimates remain substantively una®ected. In
column 4 we enter a full set of district level ¯xed e®ects.30 In column 5 we
29Similar tables are available for the probability of winning upon request.
30Prior studies of incumbency advantage have used district or state ¯xed e®ects to cap-
30add a full set of year e®ects31 and in column 6 we add the full set of covariates.
Again, the estimated incumbency advantage for both parties is remarkably
robust, i.e. the estimate stays well within sampling variability of the baseline
estimate while precision is increased. Finally, the estimated e®ects even stay
rather stable when we control for pre-determined characteristics using a very
di®erent method. In column 7 we ¯rst regress each party's current vote
share on the full set of covariates and district and year ¯xed e®ects, and
then estimate the discontinuity gap using the residuals of the ¯rst stage
regression as the response variable. Again, the estimates stays well within
sampling variability of the baseline estimate. This is what we would expect
if treatment is conditionally independent of all pre-determined covariates at
the threshold. If the average of the predetermined covariates is continuous
through the threshold, a linear function of those covariates should be smooth
through the threshold as well (Lee, forthcoming).
Tables 7 and 8 display similar falsi¯cation tests for the British case.32 For
both the Tories and the Labour party, the incumbency e®ect is strikingly
stable across di®erent speci¯cations. In each model, the point estimate stays
well within the sampling variability of the baseline estimate, while we gain
ture the normal vote (Levitt and Wolfram, 1997; Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2004). Apart
from the normal vote, district ¯xed e®ects will account for any unobserved heterogeneity
across districts in all time-constant factors that may a®ect vote share.
31In the incumbency literature year ¯xed e®ects are often included to account for com-
mon trends such as partisan tides (national swings towards a party). Note that even with
district and year ¯xed e®ects conventional (non-quasi-experimental) estimates may still be
biased due to district speci¯c, transient shocks that may a®ect vote shares. These should
not, however, bias our RDD estimates given that local random assignment holds.
32Similar tables are available for the probability of winning upon request.
31e±ciency.33
Overall, these robustness tests greatly increase our con¯dence in our es-
timates and the assumption of conditional independence at the threshold
underlying our model. Our results lead us to conclude that in both Ger-
many and the UK, party incumbency has a clear causal e®ect on parties'
fortunes in close district elections. While prior estimates of the incumbency
advantage have been plagued by potential biases, our analysis shows that the
party incumbency e®ect is real, even if the pervasive problems of non-random
selection into treatment are accounted for.
11 Conclusion
It is well known that estimating causal e®ects from observational studies pro-
vides researches with a formidable challenge. There is an increasing aware-
ness across all the social sciences that conventional regression models are
ill-suited for this task, given the pervasive self-selection to treatment based
on unobservables. As Sobel puts it in a recent review: \rarely is the state of
knowledge in the social sciences adequate for a researcher to feel con¯dent
that he or she has measured all of the relevant covariates. The possibility of
hidden bias (relevant unobserved covariates) is great." (Sobel, 2000, 649).
The literature on incumbency advantage in the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives has begun to recognize these shortcomings. Recent scholarship is
33Kernel regression estimates will be presented in a later version of this paper.
32increasingly turning towards quasi-experimental frameworks that allow for
more reliable causal estimates under a weaker set of assumptions. Our paper
applies this idea to British and German elections. Following recent work in
economics, we use a Regression Discontinuity Design that exploits the lo-
cal random assignment to treatment that takes place in close district races.
Based on the assumption that candidates do not exert perfect control over
their vote shares, candidates that barely won or lost a race should be similar
in their distribution of observed and unobserved confounders, thus enabling
us to estimate the causal e®ects of party incumbency. In both British and
German federal elections, we ¯nd that party incumbency has a signi¯cant
positive impact on vote shares and the probability of winning. This stands
in contrast to previous more ambiguous ¯ndings. Future research should rely
on similar quasi-experimental research designs to discriminate between the
individual sources of party incumbency advantage, for the cases considered
here and others.
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Figure 1: The Party Incumbency E®ect for the CDU: Outcome Vote Share
in Next Election



































3Figure 2: The Party Incumbency E®ect for the SPD: Outcome Vote Share
in Next Election



































4Figure 3: The Party Incumbency E®ect for the Tories: Outcome Vote Share
in Next Election






































5Figure 4: The Party Incumbency E®ect for the Labour Party: Outcome Vote
Share in Next Election






































6Figure 5: Validity Check for Local Random Assignment at Discontinuity -
The Party Incumbency E®ect for the CDU: Outcome Vote Share in Current
Election





































7Figure 6: Validity Check for Local Random Assignment at Discontinuity -
The Party Incumbency E®ect for the SPD: Outcome Vote Share in Current
Election





































8Figure 7: Validity Check for Local Random Assignment at Discontinuity -
The Party Incumbency E®ect for the Tories: Outcome Vote Share in Current
Election








































9Figure 8: Validity Check for Local Random Assignment at Discontinuity -
The Party Incumbency E®ect for the Labour Party: Outcome Vote Share in
Current Election









































Table 1: The Causal E®ect of Party Incumbency in Germany (1961-1998)
Response Variable Incumbent Non.Incumbent ATE .90 LB .90 UB
Vote Share SPD 46:17 44:70 1:48 0:28 2:66
(0:57) (0:42) (0:74)
Vote Share CDU 43:37 41:77 1:60 0:27 2:94
(0:48) (0:65) (0:79)
PR(Win) SPD 0:77 0:57 0:20 0:00 0:38
(0:09) (0:07) (0:11)
PR(Win) CDU 0:42 0:21 0:21 0:05 0:37
(0:07) (0:07) (0:10)
All estimates at the threshold based on multiplicative fourth-order polynomial ¯t to both sides of the threshold. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. N = 1:972 in all estimations.
Table 2: The Causal E®ect of Party Incumbency in the UK (1959-1992)
Response Variable Incumbent Non.Incumbent ATE .90 LB .90 UB
Vote Share labour 43:16 41:30 1:86 0:47 3:23
(0:60) (0:58) (0:81)
Vote Share Tories 45:19 42:55 2:64 1:44 3:82
(0:51) (0:53) (0:71)
PR(Win) labour 0:63 0:45 0:18 0:02 0:33
(0:06) (0:07) (0:09)
PR(Win) tories 0:60 0:37 0:23 0:07 0:39
(0:07) (0:07) (0:10)
All estimates at the threshold based on multiplicative fourth-order polynomial ¯t to both sides of the threshold. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. N = 3:470 in all estimations.
51Table 3: Random Assignment Checks for Predetermined Covariates in Ger-
many
CDU SPD
Covariate Inc Non-Inc Di® Inc Non-Inc Di®
V oteshare 44:13 43:92 0:21 43:90 44:21 ¡0:31
(0:25) (0:31) (0:40) (0:31) (0:25) (0:40)
V Share2 1954:89 1933:27 21:61 1933:34 1958:71 ¡25:37
(22:68) (25:89) (34:42) (27:24) (19:88) (33:72)
Turnout 85:21 84:80 0:41 84:79 85:14 ¡0:34
(0:45) (0:63) (0:77) (0:63) (0:44) (0:77)
Turnout2 7283:16 7209:08 74:08 7207:98 7270:53 ¡62:55
(75:00) (104:22) (128:41) (104:31) (74:04) (127:92)
V Share*Turnout 3757:36 3727:11 30:25 3728:53 3780:31 ¡51:79
(36:27) (44:24) (57:21) (45:66) (33:89) (56:86)
V Share2*Turnout2 1418:23 1398:25 19:98 1403:45 1443:74 ¡40:30
(29:20) (31:68) (43:09) (34:99) (23:88) (42:36)
State1 0:05 0:08 ¡0:03 0:08 0:05 0:03
(0:02) (0:03) (0:04) (0:03) (0:02) (0:04)
State2 0:03 0:04 ¡0:01 0:04 0:03 0:01
(0:02) (0:03) (0:04) (0:03) (0:02) (0:04)
State3 0:20 0:07 0:12 0:07 0:19 ¡0:11
(0:04) (0:04) (0:06) (0:04) (0:04) (0:06)
State4 0:00 0:01 ¡0:01 0:01 0:00 0:01
(0:00) (0:01) (0:01) (0:01) (0:00) (0:01)
State5 0:23 0:32 ¡0:09 0:32 0:23 0:09
(0:05) (0:07) (0:08) (0:07) (0:04) (0:08)
State6 0:19 0:17 0:02 0:17 0:19 ¡0:02
(0:04) (0:05) (0:06) (0:05) (0:04) (0:06)
State7 0:04 0:08 ¡0:05 0:08 0:04 0:05
(0:02) (0:03) (0:04) (0:03) (0:02) (0:04)
State8 0:08 0:11 ¡0:03 0:11 0:07 0:04
(0:03) (0:04) (0:05) (0:04) (0:03) (0:05)
State9 0:15 0:10 0:05 0:10 0:15 ¡0:06
(0:03) (0:04) (0:05) (0:04) (0:03) (0:05)
State10 0:05 0:01 0:03 0:01 0:05 ¡0:03
(0:02) (0:02) (0:03) (0:02) (0:02) (0:03)
All estimates at the threshold based on multiplicative fourth-order polynomial ¯t to both sides of the threshold. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. N = 1:972 in all estimations. The unit of interaction of squared terms is scaled down (by
1000) for presentational purposes.
52Table 4: Random Assignment Checks for Predetermined Covariates in the
UK
Labour Tories
Covariates Inc Non-Inc Di® Inc Non-Inc Di®
V Sharet¡1 42:26 42:84 ¡0:57 42:94 42:53 0:41
(0:29) (0:27) (0:40) (0:27) (0:29) (0:39)
V Share2
t¡1 1796:97 1825:84 ¡28:86 1851:10 1815:59 35:51
(25:30) (20:48) (32:55) (24:41) (22:80) (33:40)
All estimates at the threshold based on multiplicative fourth-order polynomial ¯t to both sides of the threshold. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. N = 3:470 in all estimations. The unit of interaction of squared terms is scaled down (by
1000) for presentational purposes.
Table 5: Robustness Checks for CDU Incumbency E®ect
Response Variable VShare VShare VShare VShare VShare VShare Residuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Incumbency 1.598 1.405 1.377 1.615 1.015 1.104 0.925
(0.786) (0.693) (0.699) (0.941) (0.514) (0.479) (0.373)







District FEs X X X
Year FEs X X
All estimations include a fourth-order polynomial in the margin of victory in previous election plus all interactions with
incumbency (coe±cients not shown here). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. N = 1:972 in all estimations. In Model
7 the dependent variable is the residuals from a regression of vote share in the current election on all predetermined
covariates plus all FEs. See text for details.
53Table 6: Robustness Checks for SPD Incumbency E®ect
Response Variable VShare VShare VShare VShare VShare VShare Residuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Incumbency 1.475 1.615 1.607 1.755 0.908 0.926 0.795
(0.735) (0.693) (0.69) (0.864) (0.522) (0.468) (0.375)







District FEs X X X
Year FEs X X
All estimations include a fourth-order polynomial in the margin of victory in previous election plus all interactions with
incumbency (coe±cients not shown here). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. N = 1:972 in all estimations. In Model
7 the dependent variable is the residuals from a regression of vote share in the current election on all predetermined
covariates plus all FEs. See text for details.
Table 7: Robustness Checks for Tories Incumbency E®ect
Response Variable VShare VShare VShare VShare VShare VShare Residuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Incumbency 2.635 2.356 2.37 2.325 2.009 1.961 1.552
(0.711) (0.69) (0.693) (.709) (.501) (.471) (0.387)





District FEs X X X
Year FEs X X
All estimations include a fourth-order polynomial in the margin of victory in previous election plus all interactions with
incumbency (coe±cients not shown here). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. N = 3:470 in all estimations. In Model
7 the dependent variable is the residuals from a regression of vote share in the current election on all predetermined
covariates plus all FEs. See text for details.
54Table 8: Robustness Checks for Labour Incumbency E®ect
Response Variable VShare VShare VShare VShare VShare VShare Residuals
Model No (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Incumbency 1.861 1.979 2.079 2.486 1.668 1.624 1.261
(0.81) (0.824) (0.798) (1.002) (0.612) (0.595) (0.444)




District FEs X X X
Year FEs X X
All estimations include a fourth-order polynomial in the margin of victory in previous election plus all interactions with
incumbency (coe±cients not shown here). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. N = 3:470 in all estimations. In Model
7 the dependent variable is the residuals from a regression of vote share in the current election on all predetermined
covariates plus all FEs. See text for details.
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